The Ineffectiveness of Torture in the War on Terrorism
At the start of the interview, Mark Fallon, a former counterintelligence officer, counterterrorism operative, and a Naval Criminal Investigative Service agent for more than thirty years, offers his opinions concerning the ineffectiveness of torture in the global war on terrorism, what the outcomes of such methods have not only on those at the receiving end but also what are dealt with from the agent giving the treatment. Fallon includes the actions of President Bush’s green light on the programs in Yemen, the fact that CIA operatives brought in were not trained to work in an interview capacity, and how the utilization of matching Al-Qaida’s tactics has done little to solve the problem of terrorist organizations. Though such methods may have some effectiveness at a tactical level, torture is an ineffective Operational strategy in the fight against terrorism. Just minutes into the interview, Fallon mimics this by saying there was no long-term strategy of what to do with these prisoners other than extracting information from them and ultimately hope for the best[1].
After the introductions, Mr. Fallon introduces actions taken by the Bush administration shortly after 9/11, publishing four memos on what actions could be taken regarding interrogations of suspected terrorists. These included waterboarding and authorized up to 180 hours of sleep deprivation, nudity, physical assaults, and being placed in cramped environments for long periods[2]. The CIA took steps alongside operations inside Afghanistan to end what was now being called The Global War on Terrorism[3]. Before such rash actions were taken, the United Nations Convention against Torture, ratified by the US in 1994, defines torture as:
… any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.[4]
Fallon explicitly explains that “we ended up stooping to their level and we were ultimately no better than some of the men we detained,” which was ultimately against the laws in which America agreed to concern the matter of torture just eight years prior. Fallon was not one of the men who carried out such actions, but he was one of those in charge of agents who carried out the President’s orders. He talks about the issues that arose with the detainee’s mental state and the mental scars carried by the interrogators themselves. Such actions were not in the CIA agent’s job descriptions, and they were ultimately not prepared to inflict such violence upon others. Fallon recalls a time which he had an agent on the verge of suicide due to the trauma of carrying out such actions on another human being, which extracted little from the captor, and left both parties scarred for life. Many of these policies were abandoned near the end of the Obama administration, but a couple remained, including the infamous waterboarding and “pressure point” techniques.[5] Fallon concludes by praising the Obama administration for creating some accountability for torture, but he also condemned Obama for not ending the policy altogether, saying that it was not a tremendous operational strategy[6]
In the end, the author believes that torture can be effective, but only in certain situations. If a child is about to die if the detainee does not say where they are, I am okay with breaking a finger or two. If there is a sleeper cell of terrorists, a secret site of a nuclear weapon, or a conspiracy to assassinate the President, I believe that it would be perfectly okay to waterboard someone until they reveal what they know. I also understand that this method should not be a universal way to deal with an enemy. Most people are more than willing to talk to you after a meal and a cigarette instead of pressure point techniques. Ultimately, the Operational level should be focused more on collecting information than forcing it out of the enemy.
[1] Mark Fallon, “No Good Intelligence Is Gained Through Torture: Coming To Grips With The Use Of Torture As An Instrument Of War,” interview by David Siry, 29 March 2016, West Point Oral History Center [http://www.westpointcoh.org/interviews/no-good-intelligence-is-gained-through-torture-coming-to-grips-with-the-use-of-torture-as-an-instrument-of-war] (accessed 10/2/19 ).
[2] MacAskill, Ewen. “Torture Techniques Endorsed by the Bush Administration.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, April 17, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/17/torture-methods-interrogation-george-bush-approved.
[3] Smith, Gene A., David Coffey, and Kyle Longley. In Harms Way: a History of the American Military Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. pp. 488-490.
[4] Arendt, H. (1994). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. New York, NY: Penguin.
[5] Serwer, Adam. “Obama's Legacy of Impunity for Torture.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 16 Mar. 2018, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/obamas-legacy-of-impunity-for-torture/555578/.
[6] See note 1.